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According to the objection of inactivity (apraxia), the skeptics cannot live 
their skepticism, since any attempt to apply it to everyday life would re-
sult in total inactivity, while any action they would perform qua skeptics 
would be a sign that they abandoned their skepticism. In this paper I 
discuss the ancient Pyrrhonists’ response to the objection as is presented 
in the writings of Sextus Empiricus. Sextus argues that the Pyrrhonists 
are immune to the apraxia objection because it is based on the misun-
derstanding of their position, that is, on the wrong assumption that they 
live in accordance with philosophical logos. To live in accordance with 
philosophical logos includes two things. First, it includes the idea that 
one should apply one’s philosophical tenets, concepts and recommenda-
tions to ordinary human life and use it as a practical guide. However, 
the only item that survives skeptical philosophy, appearance, is not used 
in this way: its role as criterion of action is different. Second, it includes 
the idea that ordinary human life can be, and should be, described in 
philosophical terms. However, the skeptics refuse to describe their ac-
tions in philosophical terms. More specifi cally, they refuse to describe 
their actions in terms of beliefs: from the Pyrrhonists’ point of view, the 
question “Do you have beliefs?” is misplaced, since any answer to it, af-
fi rmative or negative, is as credible as any other, since it is about some-
thing non-evident.
Keywords: Appearances, apraxia, beliefs, Pyrrhonism, Sextus Em-
piricus.
The objection of inactivity (apraxia) has been one of the most serious 
and the most famous objections to ancient skepticism. In a nutshell, 
the objection is that the skeptics cannot live their skepticism, since 
any attempt to apply it to everyday life would result in total inactiv-
ity, while any action they would perform qua skeptics would be a sign 
that they abandoned their skepticism. The objection is important not 
only because it looks like an elegant, simple and convincing refutation 
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of skepticism, but also because the skeptics’ response to it can tell us 
much about how to understand their position.1
Ancient Pyrrhonism, which was considered a particularly radical 
form of skepticism, was especially liable to this objection. The Pyrrhon-
ists say that for any way in which something appears to one, or for 
any appearance, there is an opposing appearance, and that, due to the 
equipollence of the opposed appearances, they suspend judgment about 
whether things are such as they appear.2 Such a position straightfor-
wardly invited the apraxia objection. The Pyrrhonists’ opponents ob-
jected that the skeptic is thus reduced to total inactivity, “staying fi xed 
like some vegetable” (Sextus Empiricus, Against the Ethicists [M 11] 
11.162), since suspending judgment precludes him from making any 
choice or avoidance.3
Sextus insists that the Pyrrhonists’ position is immune to the 
apraxia objection, for two reasons. First, he says that the Pyrrhonists 
attend to appearances, which are their criteria of action. Second, he 
insists that the apraxia objection is misplaced because the Pyrrhon-
ists are able to choose and avoid things in accordance with everyday 
life or “non-philosophical practice.”4 In this paper I want to clear up 
some interpretative problems with such a response. In Section 1 I will 
discuss Sextus’ most elaborate treatment of the apraxia objection (M 
11.162–6). My aim is to show that Sextus’ response to the objection in 
this passage leaves open two questions: fi rst, how is it possible to call 
the Pyrrhonist life “non-philosophical” if it is governed by a philosophi-
cal recommendation that we should suspend beliefs?; and second, what 
exactly is included in attending to appearances? In Section 2 I will 
tackle the latter question. In my opinion, both attending and assent-
ing to appearances should be understood negatively, as not being able 
to reject them. Correspondingly, appearances are the skeptics’ criteria 
of action in a minimal sense, namely, because they are the only items 
that survive both the Pyrrhonists’ theoretical inquiries––for, they are 
not the objects of theoretical inquiry––and their practical life––for, all 
appearances that a Pyrrhonist receive remain untouched, i.e. she does 
not select one of them as being more persuasive and reject the others. 
Section 3 will address the notorious question of whether the Pyrrhon-
ists have beliefs. I will try to show why, from the Pyrrhonists’ point 
of view, this question is misplaced. As a consequence, suspension of 
1 For an illuminating recent discussion, see Vogt (2010). See also Striker (1980).
2 “Appearances” here are taken in a wide sense, including not only the objects 
of perception but the objects of thought as well. For such a use of “appearance,” see 
Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism (PH) 2.10, Against the Logicians (M 7 and 
8) 8.362; see also Frede (1973: 809–810); Burnyeat (1997: 39).
3 Translations from Against the Ethicists and Against the Logicians are by Bett 
(1997) and (2005) respectively, while translations from Outlines of Pyrrhonism (PH) 
are by Annas and Barnes (2000), occasionally with modifi cations.
4 For the fi rst reason, see PH 1.23, 237; M 7.30; for the second, see M 11.165; PH 
1.226, 231; 2.102, 246, 254.
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beliefs does not enter into the explanation of skeptics’ action. It only 
explains why they fare better than the dogmatists and why they are 
able to achieve tranquility.
Hopefully, these considerations will help us to make sense of Sextus’ 
claim that those who make the apraxia objection “do not understand 
that the skeptic does not live in accordance with philosophical logos” (M 
11.165). They wrongly assume that the Pyrrhonists use appearances as 
action-guiding principles, in a way in which the doctrinal philosophers 
use their criteria; and they do not see that the Pyrrhonists refuse to 
describe their actions in terms of beliefs. Hence, in a sense, Sextus re-
sponds to the apraxia objection by trying to show that the Pyrrhonists 
are in a position to refuse to engage with it.
1
Sextus’ most elaborate discussion of the apraxia objection is found in 
Against the Ethicists (M 11.162–6):
Hence one also needs to look down on those who think that [the skeptic] 
is reduced to inactivity (anenergēsia) or to inconsistency (apemphasis)––to 
inactivity, because, since the whole of life is bound up with choices and 
avoidances, the person who neither chooses nor avoids anything in effect 
renounces life and stays fi xed like some vegetable, and to inconsistency, 
because if he comes under the power of a tyrant and is compelled to do some 
unspeakable deed, either he will not endure what has been commanded, 
but will choose a voluntary death, or to avoid torture he will do what has 
been ordered, and thus no longer “Will be empty of avoidance and choice,” 
to quote Timon, but will choose one thing and shrink from the other, which 
is characteristic of those who have apprehended with confi dence that there 
is something to be avoided and to be chosen. In saying this, of course, they 
do not understand that the sceptic does not live in accordance with philo-
sophical logos (for as far as this is concerned he is inactive), but that in ac-
cordance with non-philosophical practice (kata tēn aphilosophon tērēsin) he 
is able to choose some things and avoid others. And if compelled by a tyrant 
to perform some forbidden act, he will choose one thing, perhaps, and avoid 
the other by the preconception which accords with his ancestral laws and 
customs; and in fact he will bear the harsh situation more easily compared 
with the dogmatist, because he does not, like the latter, have any further 
opinion over and above these conditions.
Sextus says that the Pyrrhonists do not live in accordance with philo-
sophical logos. Philosophical logos includes dogmatic philosophical sys-
tems. More specifi cally, as is suggested by the words “further opinion” 
at the very end of the passage quoted, it includes the idea that action 
and passion involve holding beliefs about what is by nature good or 
bad.5 Since the Pyrrhonists insist that they have no beliefs about what 
is by nature good or bad,6 their opponents––doctrinal philosophers or 
5 This is the source of the dogmatists’ disturbance: see PH 3.236; M 11.158–61.
6 Sextus actually argues both that nothing is good or bad by nature (see M 11.68–
95, 110, 118, 140; PH 3.178, 182) and that the Pyrrhonists suspend judgment about 
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dogmatists––conclude that they either do not choose or avoid anything 
(that they are inactive) or that, if they do, they abandon their skepti-
cism (that they are inconsistent).7
An obvious response to such an objection is to reject the assumption 
that choosing and avoiding require beliefs about what is good or bad 
and to insist that the Pyrrhonists are able to choose and avoid things on 
different grounds. This is precisely what Sextus does in the passage: he 
says that the Pyrrhonists choose and avoid things in accordance with 
non-philosophical practice. Thus, if a Pyrrhonist under a tyrant’s con-
trol refuses to commit some horrible act––say, to kill her parents––the 
account of what she has done does not include any consideration that 
has to do with a preferred or privileged status of some of her beliefs. She 
has just decided to save her parents because this is what her laws and 
customs tell her to do. In terms of the Outlines of Pyrrhonism, she has 
decided to save her parents because doing so has appeared best to her. 
Her following laws and customs of her society is not based on any belief, 
but is, presumably, just a way of following appearances. This is why 
Sextus says that appearances are the skeptics’ criteria of action (PH 
1.22). There are two groups of problems with such a response.
(1) The Pyrrhonists suspend judgment about whether there is some-
thing that is by nature good or bad. Ordinary people, who are engaged 
in non-philosophical practice, do not suspend beliefs, and do not just 
follow appearances. Sextus is aware of the fact that ordinary people 
choose or avoid things because they believe that they are good or bad, 
and that non-philosophical practice is actually heavily permeated 
with dogmatic beliefs, especially political, moral and religious beliefs.8 
Hence, “non-philosophical practice” can refer only to life as it is after 
the Pyrrhonist reform, that is, after the Pyrrhonists have eliminated 
all beliefs from it. But then the question arises not only as to how such 
a life is possible but also why it can be called non-philosophical. For, 
one might object that to lead a life without beliefs is to be governed 
by a philosophical logos, that is, by a philosophical theory which rec-
ommends suspension of belief. To be sure, Sextus does not view Pyr-
rhonism as a philosophical theory, but rather as a kind of ability (PH 
1.8). However, even if we grant this, it is still not clear how can the 
exercise of skeptical ability be called “everyday practice.”
whether there is something good or bad by nature (see PH 3.182, 235). I need not 
enter into this complicated issue here. See Machuca (2011a).
7 There are, of course, some important differences between the inactivity charge 
(or, as Vogt (2010: 166) calls it, the plant charge) and inconsistency charge, but they 
need not be discussed here.
8 Thus he says that “both ordinary people and philosophers think ... that there 
is such a thing as good and bad ... yet are at war with one another as far as specifi cs 
are concerned” (M 11.44). Likewise, when introducing the fi rst mode of Agrippa, he 
says that both ordinary people and philosophers are involved in disputes about the 
proposed problem (PH 1.165). See also Frede (1997: 22).
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In other words, it seems that, even if the Pyrrhonists were able to 
show that life without beliefs is possible, they could not consistently 
maintain that they (a) live in accordance with common preconceptions 
of ordinary people; (b) suspend judgment about whether these precon-
ceptions embody beliefs about what is good or bad by nature; and (c) 
nevertheless claim that they live in accordance with non-philosophical 
practice. Suppose, to take another example, that a Pyrrhonist lives in 
a society whose laws and customs forbid incestuous relationships. She 
will obey these laws and customs and will not engage in incestuous 
relationships, but she will suspend judgment about whether incest is 
something bad by nature, as she is aware of the opposing arguments, 
advanced by some members of the Stoic school, that incest is not ob-
jectively bad, but indifferent (see, for instance, PH 1.160, 3.205; M 
11.192). However, her justifi cation of the claim that she follows non-
philosophical practice had better not include her suspension: for why 
would life which consists in obeying the laws and customs and sus-
pending belief be considered non-philosophical, as opposed to life which 
consists in, say, obeying the laws and customs because of belief that 
they embody what is objectively good? The standards of what counts 
as non-philosophical practice cannot be ones that a non-philosophical 
community would not recognize as such, and it is hardly credible that 
in this regard the Pyrrhonists would fare differently from members of 
other philosophical schools. Hence, since they do have a position to-
wards good and bad––suspension of judgment––which can be properly 
called philosophical (though not dogmatic), it seems that, if they hold 
(a) and (b), the Pyrrhonists cannot hold (c) as well.
(2) According to the skeptical stance presented in the Outlines of 
Pyrrhonism, the skeptics just attend to appearances. The problem with 
this comes to light in the tyrant example, which serves to stress the in-
consistency of the Pyrrhonists’ position.9 To stress the inconsistency of 
the Pyrrhonists’ position, the (unknown) author of the objection could 
have pointed to any action performed by a Pyrrhonist and argued that 
it contradicts the Pyrrhonists’ proclaimed lack of beliefs. In the quoted 
passage, he points instead to a very harsh situation: a person is forced 
into a condition over which she has no power. She must either commit 
a horrible deed, say, kill her parents, or refuse to do so and face up to 
death. Her situation is thus doubly uncontrollable: she is involuntarily 
put into this condition, and whatever she does, she is forced to do. She 
does not even have a choice between doing x and doing something else 
instead: she must either do x or refrain from doing x. But regardless of 
what she does––and this is the crux of the objection––she must make 
a choice and thus prefer one option over another. Stated in this way, 
the example stresses the epistemic predicament in which a Pyrrhonist, 
by attending to appearances, fi nds herself. She is also involuntarily 
exposed to appearances, and her assent to appearance is also passive. 
9 A similar example is found in Diogenes Laertius 9.108. See Bett (1997: 174–6).
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However, her acting on appearance must involve a decision, since she 
does not have to act on that appearance. If it appears to the Pyrrhon-
ist that it is hot, she cannot resist but must assent to this; but if she 
then moves to a colder spot, her action is preceded by a decision to act 
according to this appearance. Hence, assent to appearances is not suf-
fi cient for action, just as being involuntarily forced to commit a horrible 
deed or not is not suffi cient for action. Thus, it seems that the tyrant ex-
ample already presupposes the Pyrrhonist framework as is developed 
in the fi rst book of the Outlines of Pyrrhonism, and that the author of 
the example makes a further objection, namely, that to say that the 
Pyrrhonists just attend to appearances is not a satisfactory response 
to the apraxia objection because to assent to an appearance is not yet 
to act on it.10 Sextus’ laconic response to this further objection suggests 
that he thinks that it is also based on the misunderstanding of the 
Pyrrhonist position, and that the Pyrrhonists’ insistence on attending 
to appearances does provide a satisfactory response. It has been left 
unexplained, however, what is included in attending to appearances so 
that they can serve as the criteria of action.
Thus, to appreciate Sextus’ response to the apraxia objection, one 
should answer two questions: fi rst, how is it possible to call the Pyr-
rhonist life ordinary, non-philosophical life, given that it seems to be 
governed by a philosophical recommendation that we should suspend 
beliefs?;11 and second, how is it possible to live without beliefs, just 
by attending to appearances? These are big questions, especially the 
second, which is among the most debated topics in Pyrrhonian scholar-
ship. I will attempt to show that both questions require a single an-
swer. I will fi rst, in Section 2, discuss Sextus’ idea that appearances 
are the skeptics’ criteria of action and then, in Section 3, address the 
notorious question of the skeptics’ beliefs.
2
In the Outlines of Pyrrhonism Sextus addresses the apraxia objection 
in his discussion of the criterion of skepticism:
That we attend to appearances (tois phainomenois prosechomen) is clear 
from what we say about the criterion of sceptical persuasion. “Criterion” has 
two senses: there are criteria adopted to provide conviction about the reality 
or unreality of something (we shall talk about these criteria when we turn 
to attack them); and there are criteria of action, attending to which in every-
day life (kata ton bion) we perform some actions and not others––and it is 
these criteria which are our present subject. We say, then, that the criterion 
of the sceptical persuasion is the appearance, implicitly meaning by this 
10 In saying this, I do not want to suggest anything about the complicated 
problem of the chronology of Sextus’ writings.
11 Or that suspension of belief is a matter of psychological necessity; for a recent 
discussion on whether suspension is to be understood psychologically or normatively, 
see Lammenranta (2008).
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the impression (phantasia); for it depends on passive and unwilled affec-
tions and is not the object of investigation. (Hence no-one, presumably, will 
raise a controversy over whether an existing thing appears this way or that; 
rather, they investigate whether it is such as it appears.) Thus, attending to 
appearances, we live in accordance with everyday practice (kata tēn biōtikēn 
tērēsin), without holding opinions (adoxastōs)––for we are not able to be ut-
terly inactive (anenergētoi). This everyday practice seems to be fourfold, and 
to consist in guidance by nature, necessitation by feelings, handing down of 
laws and customs, and teaching of kinds of expertise. (PH 1.21–3)
At fi rst glance, Sextus’ point is clear: the Pyrrhonists are not inactive 
because they have criteria, appearances, on the basis of which they 
take or avoid some course of action. What is less clear, however, is in 
what sense exactly can appearances be called criteria. Sextus says that 
appearances are criteria of action, “attending to which in everyday life 
we perform some actions and not others.”12 As opposed to the elaborate 
distinction of various senses of the criterion of truth (PH 2.15–6; M 
7.31–4), he is silent about what it means to say of something that it is 
criterion of action.13
The criteria of truth, which the Pyrrhonists repudiate, are supposed 
to discriminate between what is real and what is not real, or between 
what is true and what is false. Correspondingly, we can assume that 
the criteria of action should serve as guides in the Pyrrhonist’s life by 
discriminating courses of action which she will take and those which 
she will avoid, that is, that they are judges in cases of confl icts. Such 
an account, however, is not satisfactory as it stands. We may grant that 
the Pyrrhonist will follow appearance when it is in confl ict with some 
doctrinal belief. We may also grant that, faced with the confl ict among 
appearances, she will not turn to a higher judge or authority to resolve 
it, but will adhere to appearances themselves. It is not clear, however, 
how she will decide which appearance she should follow.
Sextus’ discussion might suggest that his account of the fourfold 
regime of everyday life is meant, among other things, to delineate a 
domain of appearances which are in accordance with non-philosophical 
practice or everyday life and which will guide the Pyrrhonists’ actions.14 
Sextus goes on:
12 See also M 7.29; at 7.30 appearance is said to be the criterion of choice and 
avoidance.
13 His discussion of Arcesilaus’ (M 7.158) and Carneades’ (M 7.166–89) criteria of 
action is not of much help either. Brennan (2000: 67–9) argues that the four elements 
of everyday practice (PH 1.23–4, discussed below) are conceived by Sextus as criteria 
of action (Brunschwig 1994: 236 is more cautious), but the text does not support 
this. Sextus does suggest (M 7.33) that the fi rst two groups of the criteria of truth 
(“every measure of apprehension,” e.g. sight, hearing, and taste, and “every technical 
measure of apprehension,” e.g. cubit, scales, ruler, and compass) are “the everyday” 
(biōtika) criteria, but they should not be confused with the criteria of action.
14 Thus, for instance, Vogt (2010: 174): “Not every passively experienced 
impression guides the sceptic’s action. Rather, only those passively experienced 
impressions that go along with an ordinary way of leading one’s life do so. Thus, 
appearances can do the work of a practical criterion.”
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By nature’s guidance we are naturally capable of perceiving and thinking. 
By the necessitation of feelings, hunger conducts us to food and thirst to 
drink. By the handing down of customs and laws, we accept, from the every-
day point of view, that piety is good and impiety bad. By teaching of kinds of 
expertise we are not inactive in those which we accept. (1.24)
So, on this interpretation, being affected by the object of perception or 
thought; being hungry or thirsty; following laws and customs (or, more 
generally, common preconceptions); following instructions in arts––
these are all ways of how one can be appeared to in accordance with 
everyday life, and it is by attending to these appearances that the Pyr-
rhonist lives. Moreover, it may be argued that the above account of the 
fourfold regime stresses the passivity which characterizes the Pyrrhon-
ist’s attitude toward appearances: just as she involuntarily assents to 
appearances, so she is a passive subject of natural and societal forces.
There are two problems with this interpretation. First, such an in-
terpretation leaves open the question what the Pyrrhonist will do in 
cases in which all relevant appearances belong to this supposedly ac-
ceptable, action-guiding domain of appearances. For, in such cases, no 
appearance is privileged so that it can serve as a judge. We may grant 
that, if it appears to the Pyrrhonist (a) that she is hungry and that 
there is a sandwich in front of her, and if it also appears to her (b) that 
a philosophical argument to the effect that three-dimensional bodies 
(or external world, for that matter) do not exist is sound, then she will 
certainly assent to (a), which belongs to the class of “everyday prac-
tice.” But she may also be torn between confl icting appearances which 
both belong to this class: she may be hungry and passively attracted 
to the sandwich but also accustomed to involuntarily follow a law that 
forbids her to eat on this particular day.
Second, the only ingredient of the fourfold regime that can be 
straightforwardly understood on the model of what is going on in in-
voluntary receiving appearances is the second on Sextus’ list, neces-
sitation of feelings. Sextus himself makes this clear in his discussion 
of the relationship between Pyrrhonism and the Methodical school in 
medicine (PH 1.237–41). One similarity between the two schools con-
cerns the fact that the Methodics follow appearances in their practices. 
To explain the similarity, Sextus fi rst reminds the reader that the Pyr-
rhonists follow the fourfold regime of everyday life (1.237), and then 
argues that “everything which the Methodics say in this vein can be 
brought under the necessitation of feelings, either natural or unnatu-
ral” (1.239). Thus, he clearly distinguishes the necessitation of feelings 
from other ingredients of the fourfold regime, thereby suggesting that a 
correspondence between what is going on in receiving appearances and 
holding on to the fourfold regime exists only as far as this ingredient 
is concerned. Furthermore, when speaking of the nature’s guidance, 
he is not referring to the involuntariness by which the Pyrrhonists are 
affected by the objects of perception and thought, but to the plain fact 
that we are beings naturally endowed with the capacities for percep-
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tion and thought. The same holds for handing down of customs and 
laws: the emphasis is only on the fact that the Pyrrhonists live in a 
particular human society, and not on the process by which they inter-
nalize its laws and customs. Finally, “by teaching of kinds of expertise 
we are not inactive in those which we accept” does not suggest that it 
is the special kind of training––which consists, perhaps, in automati-
cally following the instructions or something like that––that enables 
the Pyrrhonist to be an expert in her profession. It rather suggests only 
that the Pyrrhonists are engaged in various kinds of expertise and that 
this is due to the instructions they receive just as anyone else.
Hence, appearances are not criteria because they are judges in cas-
es of confl icts. In addition, the fourfold regime of everyday life is not 
meant to be a list of privileged kinds of appearances, that is, those 
which are action-guiding for a Pyrrhonist. It is rather a list of typi-
cal human characteristics and activities which a Pyrrhonist performs 
without beliefs, just by attending to appearances. To see in what other 
sense the appearances can be called criteria, we should consider in 
what sense the Pyrrhonists “attend to” (prosechein) to them.
In the preceding chapter (1.19–20), Sextus has offered several argu-
ments against those who say that the Pyrrhonists reject appearances. 
The chapter on criteria quoted above, judging from its fi rst sentence 
(“That we attend to appearances is clear from what we say about the 
criterion of skeptical persuasion”), seems to be a continuation of that 
discussion. Sextus suggests that a further reason to insist that the Pyr-
rhonists do not reject appearances is the fact that they are the Pyr-
rhonists’ criteria of action. Moreover, the only explanation of the Pyr-
rhonists’ attending to appearances and of their being criteria of action 
found in the chapter on criteria is in terms of the Pyrrhonists’ inability 
to reject them: in 1.22 Sextus just restates his reasons why the appear-
ances cannot be rejected from the previous chapter (1.19). Hence, it 
seems that attending to appearances should be understood negatively, 
as not being able to reject them. Indeed, this is also the way in which 
assenting to appearances is understood by Sextus. Assenting to an ap-
pearance is not described in terms of forming a mental item (like belief) 
or in terms of acting according to appearance, but in terms of inability 
to reject it: if it appears to the Pyrrhonist that x is F, her assent to this 
seems to consist only in her inability to say “I think that it does not ap-
pear to me that x is F.”15 Thus in PH 1.13 (more fully discussed below, 
pp. 453–6) Sextus says: “The sceptic assents to the affections forced 
upon him in accordance with impression––for example, he would not 
say, when heated or chilled, ‘I think I am not heated (or: chilled)’.”
In view of this, it may seem strange to say that appearance is the 
Pyrrhonist’s criterion of action. For, we would expect that criterion of 
15 Hence, I do not agree with Vogt when she says: “in his positive description of 
what the sceptic does in forced assent, Sextus does not cite an utterance, or a kind of 
belief; he cites an action. The sceptic drinks, rather than saying ‘I am thirsty’.” (Vogt 
2012: 657) But I agree with her overall conclusions.
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action proposed by a philosophical school to be an item to which an 
adherent of the school can positively attend in her everyday life and 
which can serve as a guide in action. Obviously, if there is nothing more 
to attending to appearances than not rejecting them, then the Pyrrhon-
ists’ appearances cannot be such criteria. In what sense, then, can they 
be called criteria?
There is a difference between the Pyrrhonists’ and the dogmatists’ 
attitude toward appearances in action. The dogmatist, in a sense, also 
cannot reject the appearance: if it appears to him that he should save 
his parents, he cannot say “I think that it does not appear to me that I 
should save my parents.” However, he lives according to a philosophical 
logos; thus, in order to make a choice between confl icting appearanc-
es, he will apply his own criterion of action and investigate, as Sextus 
would put it, “what is said” (PH 1.19) about each of the appearances, to 
see which one of them is action-guiding in accordance with the criteri-
on. As a result, he will, in a sense, reject one of the appearances, in that 
he will act according to another; his philosophical logos will, as Sextus 
would put it, “snatch the appearance from under his very eyes” (1.20).
The situation of the Pyrrhonists is rather different. The Pyrrhonist 
philosophy consists of continuous inquiry (PH 1.1–3), that is, of mak-
ing oppositions of appearances and thoughts which lead to suspension 
of belief. Hence, their philosophy cannot provide a guide or standard 
which they can apply in their practical affairs. Indeed, any attempt to 
directly implement Pyrrhonist philosophy in ordinary life would render 
them inactive.16 At the same time, they do not want to insulate their 
philosophy from ordinary life. Pyrrhonism cannot avoid being under-
stood as a recommendation as to how to live, especially because it aims 
to show how to achieve a tranquil life.17 Hence, to engage in practical 
life qua Pyrrhonist philosophers, they can only hold to something that 
is not subject to their inquiries, and these are the appearances. For, in 
theoretical contexts, when discussing the so-called non-evident things, 
the Pyrrhonists do not investigate appearances, but what is said about 
appearances (PH 1.19). Hence, just as the dogmatists’ criterion, what-
ever it is, remains free of dogmatic scrutiny, so the Pyrrhonists’ appear-
ances also remain free of skeptical scrutiny.
The appearances survive not only the Pyrrhonists’ theoretical in-
quiries but their practical life as well. In practical contexts, all appear-
ances the Pyrrhonist receives remain untouched, since she does not 
investigate what is said about them. Suppose it appears to the Pyr-
16 Sextus actually warns that Pyrrhonism may lead to inactivity: see PH 1.226: 
they follow ordinary life “in order not to be inactive”; see also M 7.30: the skeptics 
must have some criterion of choice and avoidance “so as not to be completely inactive 
and without any part in the affairs of life.”
17 That the idea of insulation of skepticism from life cannot be found in ancient 
world is forcefully argued by Burnyeat (1997a), who insists that insulation is “a 
phenomenon of our time” (94). See also Bett (1993), who argues that things are more 
complicated. In Grgić (2011) I argue for a qualifi ed version of insulation.
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rhonist that her ancestral laws and customs require that she should 
save her parents and that it also appears to her that, because of the 
tyrant’s cruelty, she cannot save them. She will assent to both of these 
confl icting appearances––for, she cannot reject either of them––but she 
will act on only one of them. The difference between the dogmatist and 
the Pyrrhonist concerns the fact that the reason why the Pyrrhonist 
has chosen, say, to save her parents has nothing to do with philosophi-
cal logos. Since the Pyrrhonist does not investigate what is said about 
appearances to see which one is true or more persuasive given some 
further epistemic or moral standards, she can just say that she has cho-
sen to save her parents because of her ancestral laws and customs. The 
dogmatist cannot say just that; he will appeal, tacitly or explicitly, to 
some further criterion and hence live according to philosophical logos.
3
Another ingredient of Sextus’ description of the Pyrrhonists’ life is 
their living adoxastōs. To live adoxastōs is to live without doxasta; and 
doxasta are not just any beliefs, but heavily loaded doctrinal beliefs. 
In particular, they are beliefs based on judgments about something’s 
being good or bad by nature (M 11.142).18 Now, the dogmatists would 
strongly object to the very idea of leading an ordinary life without 
holding doxasta. They would insist, for instance, that it is not possible 
to live happily without doctrinal beliefs about the universe, gods, or 
human nature. Moreover, they might object that, after the doctrinal 
beliefs have been removed as in a Pyrrhonist life, a kind of life that 
would result could not be called ordinary, since some of these beliefs, 
especially moral and political beliefs, are so deeply rooted that to aban-
don them is to abandon ordinary way of living and to live governed by 
certain philosophical assumptions.
These are serious objections to Pyrrhonism. The Pyrrhonists’ life 
certainly differs from life of other people, since other people do not live 
without opinions. However, if the dogmatists were to base the apraxia 
objection on this characteristic of the skeptical life, the Pyrrhonists 
would have a ready answer. For, it is at this point that they could make 
a dialectical maneuver and say that, just as they may be required to 
account for the possibility of living adoxastōs, so the dogmatists may be 
required to account for the possibility of a life based on doxasta. Then 
they might say that since there is an undecidable dispute among phi-
losophers about everything doxastos, the dogmatists are left without 
18 See M 11.141–2: “Of things which are said to be good and bad ... some are 
introduced by opinion (kata doxan), some by necessity. By opinion are introduced 
whatever things people pursue or avoid in virtue of a judgment (kata krisin).” When 
Sextus says that the Pyrrhonists’ goal is tranquility in matters of opinion (en tois 
doxastois or en tois kata doxan) and moderation of feelings in things forced upon 
us (PH 1.25, 26, 30), by “matters of opinion” he means primarily “things which 
according to opinion are good or bad”; see M 11.144, 147.
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a foundation from which they could argue that living adoxastōs is im-
possible. In other words, they might insist that the dogmatists should 
fi rst identify a set of beliefs necessary for life, and since they heavily 
disagree about that, their objection is baseless.
While Sextus does have resources for such a dialectical strategy, 
he does not use it in a straightforward manner. However, its weaker 
version is found in Against the Ethicists 114–8, where he argues that 
adopting the dogmatists’ framework entails either inactivity or distur-
bance. For, suppose, with the dogmatists, that choosing F and acting 
on it include the belief that F is good by nature, and suppose, with the 
Pyrrhonists, that there is an undecidable dispute among philosophers 
about what is good by nature. Now, if the belief of every party of the 
dispute is true, then it is true to believe that F is good and also true 
to believe that F is not good, and this, if we accept the dogmatists’ as-
sumption, makes life impossible. On the other hand, if it is only the 
belief that F is by nature good that is true, then apraxia is avoided, 
but life based on this belief is full of disturbance, as Sextus regularly 
insists (PH 1.27–8; M 11.112–7). Hence, if, as a dialectical concession, 
the dogmatists’ framework is adopted, the best policy is to suspend 
judgment about whether there is anything good by nature.
The doctrinal beliefs––beliefs based on certain theoretical assump-
tions––are not the only kind of beliefs. There are also common-sense or 
non-doctrinal beliefs, which do not seem to entail dispute. In addition, 
the terms “belief” and “to believe” may be used to refer to various sorts 
of things. In standard sense, to believe is to take something to be true. 
But there is also a looser sense, according to which to believe is just to 
be disposed to act in a certain way. Prima facie there seems to be no 
reason why these other kinds or senses of belief could not be ascribed 
to the Pyrrhonists. Consider, for instance, the following passage by Mi-
chael Frede:
If someone steps into the house, and we ask him if it is still raining outside, 
and he, without hesitation, answers that it is, we would regard this as an 
expression of his belief that it is still raining. ... There is no reason to sup-
pose that the sceptic, if asked such a question, would not answer either yes 
or no; and there is no reason to suppose that the sceptic would mean any-
thing different by his answer than anyone else. ... It is true that the sceptic 
does not believe that it is really still raining. His answer is not grounded 
in some insight into the true nature of things, an insight such that reason 
could not but give the answer it does. ... His answer, rather, tells us only 
what seems to him to be the case; if we ask him, that is how it strikes him. 
In this respect, his answer does not differ from that of the man on the street. 
(Frede 1997: 22)
If we characterize the Pyrrhonists’ life as a life governed by common-
sense, everyday, or non-doctrinal beliefs, along the lines of Frede’s ac-
count, then Sextus’ response to the apraxia objection amounts to say-
ing that the dogmatists wrongly think that the skeptics do not hold 
common-sense beliefs, which are suffi cient for action. On the other 
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hand, if we don’t ascribe to them such beliefs, then the question recurs 
of how it is possible to live without them. Hence, we should address 
the notorious question of whether the Pyrrhonists have non-doctrinal 
beliefs.19
A key text to consider is in the Outlines of Pyrrhonism 1.13–5, where 
Sextus discusses the question “Does the skeptic dogmatize (dogmatize-
in)?” This passage may be taken to suggest––and it has been taken in 
this way by some scholars––that there is a sense of the term “dogma” 
in which it refers to non-doctrinal belief which can be ascribed to the 
Pyrrhonist, so that her mental life is, after all, describable in terms of 
certain kind of beliefs (see e.g. Frede 1997). Sextus says:
When we say that sceptic does not dogmatize, we do not take “dogma” in 
the sense in which some say, quite generally, that dogma is acquiescing (to 
eudokein) in something; for sceptic assents to the affections forced upon him 
in accordance with impression (tois gar kata phantasian katēnankasmenois 
pathesi sunkatatithetai)––for example, he would not say, when heated or 
chilled, “I think I am not heated (or: chilled)”. Rather, we say that sceptic 
does not dogmatize in the sense in which some say that dogma is assent to 
some non-evident object of investigation in the sciences; for Pyrrhonist does 
not assent to anything non-evident. (1.13)
On the one hand, Sextus’ main objective in the passage is negative: 
he wants to argue that the Pyrrhonists do not dogmatize. Since the 
Pyrrhonists make certain assertions about philosophical dogmata and, 
moreover, themselves propose certain formulas (e.g. “I determine noth-
ing”) which may give the impression that they are forms of dogmatiz-
ing, it is important to him to make it clear that these practices do not 
count as signs of dogmatizing, and that in this respect, Pyrrhonism 
differs from other kinds of philosophy. In addition, which is perhaps a 
minor point, Sextus’ discussion in the fi rst book of the Outlines is very 
methodical and organized, with chapters proceeding in an orderly man-
ner. At the end of the preceding chapter, he says that the Pyrrhonists’ 
method of putting accounts in opposition has as its result the fact that 
they do not dogmatize (1.12), and a reasonable sequel of this is to ask 
what it exactly means to say that they do not dogmatize.
Yet, on the other hand, such an organization may suggest that Sex-
tus has in mind a positive agenda as well. For, in the next two chap-
ters he discusses whether the Pyrrhonists belong to a school (haire-
sis) (1.16–7), do they study natural science (phusiologein) (18), and, 
as we have seen, what is the criterion of their skepticism (21–4). The 
Pyrrhonist position on these questions depends, among other things, 
on senses of the terms hairesis, phusiologein and kritērion: in certain 
senses, they do belong to a school, study natural science and have a cri-
terion, and in other senses not. Moreover, he says (1.16) that the Pyr-
rhonists’ position on the question of whether they belong to a school is 
19 The literature on this topic is vast (see Frede 1997; Burnyeat 1997; Barnes 
1997; Brennan 2000; Fine 2000; Perin 2010; Vogt 2012). A recent survey is found in 
Morison (2014).
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similar to their position on the question of whether they have dogmata, 
and likewise with the question of their studying natural science (1.18). 
This might suggest that Sextus’ objective in 1.13–5 is not to deny that 
the Pyrrhonists are dogmatizing, but to establish that in one sense of 
the term “dogma” they do have dogmata and in another they do not.
Note, however, that the sense in which one might say that the Pyr-
rhonists dogmatize is not explained in positive terms. Unlike his ac-
counts of the Pyrrhonist school, their pursuing natural science and 
having a criterion, Sextus does not say that, since dogma, in one sense 
of the term, is a certain kind of assent, and the Pyrrhonists do give 
such an assent, they therefore have dogmata. He also does not say, as 
one would expect if he really wanted to say something positive about 
Pyrrhonist dogmata, that, since to express the assent is to say “I think 
(believe) (It seems to me) that p (that I am affected in p-way),” the Pyr-
rhonists normally use such phrases and thus, in a sense, dogmatize. 
Rather, he says that they “would not say, when heated or chilled, ‘I 
think I am not heated (or: chilled)’” (see on this Barnes 1997: 75; Vogt 
2012: 656). Thus there is an important difference between this and 
those other cases.
It is obvious, as Sextus stresses a little later (1.13), that the Pyr-
rhonists do not have beliefs about the so-called non-evident things, that 
is, roughly, things which can be known only by means of other things. 
Can they have beliefs about evident things, or those that can be known 
by means of themselves, like the fact that it is day or that I am writing? 
It seems that they cannot, for several reasons.
First, the distinction between evident and non-evident things is of 
dogmatic origin (cf. PH 2.97), and the Pyrrhonists need not be com-
mitted to it. But even if they make a concession to the dogmatists and 
accept the distinction, they can insist that they cannot have beliefs 
about evident things simply because the dogmatists make everything 
non-evident. This is because the dogmatists maintain that nothing is 
in fact known by means of itself, but always by means of other things, 
say, affections that it produces in us: “when fi re has been brought to me 
and I have been warmed, I take the condition in me as a sign that the 
externally existing fi re is warm” (M 7.365). Hence, since warmness of 
fi re needs a sign to be known, it is a non-evident thing and Pyrrhonists 
cannot have a belief about it. Moreover, even if, as a further concession, 
the Pyrrhonist admits that there are some evident things, then, to have 
beliefs about them, she should have a criterion on the basis of which 
she would assent to some of them as true (see on this PH 2.95; M 7.25; 
see also Barnes 1997: 77–8). The Pyrrhonists, however, suspend judg-
ment about whether there is a criterion of truth. Hence, they cannot 
have beliefs either about evident or about non-evident things, and since 
the distinction between evident and non-evident things is exhaustive, 
the Pyrrhonists cannot have beliefs about things. Furthermore, Sextus 
also says that if you hold a belief, then you posit (tithetai) the object of 
belief as real (PH 1.14). It is not quite clear what is the exact mean-
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ing of “posit” here. However, it seems natural to suppose that positing 
something is preceded by assent. Since the Pyrrhonists do not assent 
either to non-evident or, as we have seen, to evident things (given the 
dogmatists’ criteria for being an evident thing), and the domain of what 
is real is exhausted by the evident and the non-evident, they do not pos-
it anything as real, and hence, do not have beliefs. Finally, if––given 
the dogmatists’ criteria––to believe is to take something as true, then 
the Pyrrhonist, to believe something, must at least have some concept 
of what is true, or about the truth-bearer. Yet the Pyrrhonists insist 
that they cannot have such a concept, because of the unresolvable dis-
sent that exists among the dogmatists (PH 2.80–94; M 8.1–140).
One might object that such line of reasoning can show only that it 
is the dogmatists, not the Pyrrhonists, who cannot have beliefs (see 
on this Brennan 2000: 67). For, if one assumes that having a belief 
includes a host of background ideas such as the classifi cation of things 
in evident and non-evident, the need for a criterion of truth, resolved 
dispute over the truth-bearer, etc., then indeed one cannot have beliefs, 
including such ordinary beliefs that it is day or that I am writing. If one 
consistently follows these dogmatic requirements for having a belief, 
then neither the dogmatists nor, indeed, anyone else can have beliefs. 
Likewise, for instance, if one follows what the dogmatists say about hu-
man beings, it would follow that human being is inconceivable or even 
does not exist (PH 2.22–33). For, to have a concept of human being, 
there should be an agreement among the dogmatists about the defi ni-
tion of human being, and about the body and the soul, but there is no 
such agreement. This, of course, does not prevent the Pyrrhonists and 
ordinary people, who are not committed to philosophical conceptions 
of human being, body and soul to say of themselves and of others that 
they are human beings. Likewise, both the Pyrrhonists and ordinary 
people can have a belief that it is day or that I am writing because they 
are not committed to the dogmatists’ requirements for having a belief. 
It is the dogmatists who, by advancing contentious theories, abolish 
beliefs, human beings and other ordinary things.
These considerations may be taken to support the idea that, after 
all, there may be a sense in which the Pyrrhonists have beliefs. While 
their beliefs need not include the ingredients required by the dogma-
tists’ account, they must include something, and this cannot be subject 
to skeptical scrutiny. Indeed, this seems to be assent, for the Pyrrhon-
ists, as Sextus says in the passage quoted, “assent to the affections 
forced upon them by appearances” (1.13). Hence, it seems that the Pyr-
rhonist’s belief includes only assent. As I have said, a comparison with 
the neighboring chapters from the beginning of the Outlines may sug-
gest that Sextus’ objective is not only to identify the sense of the term 
“dogma” according to which it is not true to say that the Pyrrhonists 
dogmatize, but also to maintain that they do have dogmata. To have a 
dogma is to assent to something, and the Pyrrhonists assent to their 
affections; hence, they have beliefs about their affections, or about how 
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they are appeared to (see Fine 2000; Perin 2010: 59–85).
There are two groups of reasons that speak against such a conclu-
sion. Some are specifi c and some are more general.
Note, to begin with specifi c reasons, that the Pyrrhonists may be 
seen as being caught in a trap. On the one hand, they unqualifi edly 
insist that they do not dogmatize: this is the conclusion of the previous 
chapter of the Outlines (1.12). On the other hand, as Sextus says, the 
most general sense of the term “dogma” is “assent” or “acquiescing” 
(1.13), and the Pyrrhonists, of course, cannot quarrel with this. Hence, 
if they unqualifi edly insist that they do not dogmatize, they seem 
obliged to admit that they do not assent to anything, which makes their 
position hopeless.
There are two ways in which the Pyrrhonists may evade the trap. 
They may admit that, by giving assent, they have dogmata. Sextus, 
however, does not say this; more importantly, he can easily avoid such 
conclusion, by admitting that the Pyrrhonists give assent (by not re-
jecting the appearances, as we have seen in Section 2) but suspend 
judgment about whether their assent should count as dogma. For, dog-
ma is a non-evident thing, as there are several different defi nitions of it 
found near the beginning of the Outlines (“acquiescing” (1.13), “assent 
to some non-evident object of investigation in the sciences” (ibid.), “as-
sent to something non-evident” (1.16)). Hence, an affi rmative answer 
to the question “Do Pyrrhonists dogmatize?” will be given only by those 
dogmatists who think that dogma includes only assent. Sextus cannot 
deny that Pyrrhonists dogmatize, since the question of what should 
count as dogma is still open for him. For the same reason, he cannot 
give the affi rmative answer either.
This leads to some more general reasons why we should be suspi-
cious of the idea that the Pyrrhonist position can be described in terms 
of beliefs, regardless of how exactly we understand the notion of belief. 
As we have seen, this idea is supported by the fact that the Pyrrhon-
ists are not obliged to accept the dogmatic requirements for believing 
something. These requirements make a cluster of closely connected no-
tions: the notion of the distinction between evident and non-evident 
things, the notions of the criterion of truth, reality, truth-bearers, etc. 
There is no reason why we shouldn’t include in this cluster the notion 
of belief as well, which is also theoretical notion like other notions in 
the cluster. For, if we argue that the Pyrrhonist is not committed to 
the view that there is a criterion of truth to believe something, then 
there is absolutely no reason why we could not argue that she is not 
committed to the view that beliefs, of any kind, play a role in account 
of human life. From the Pyrrhonists’ point of view, the question of their 
dogmatizing is misplaced. It is the dogmatists who insist on answering 
the questions “Do Pyrrhonists dogmatize?” or “Do they believe that it is 
day?” because it is they who take it for granted that the notion of belief 
is indispensable in the explanation of human action. The Pyrrhonists 
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do not share that view. They may say that any answer to these ques-
tions, affi rmative or negative, is as credible as any other, since it is 
about something non-evident.
4
Thus, Sextus’ aim is to challenge the very idea that human life should 
be described in terms of beliefs. If a Pyrrhonist says that she lives with-
out beliefs, or that she takes some course of action and avoid other 
without beliefs about what is good or bad by nature, we can take her 
to mean one of two things. On the one hand, she can be taken to mean 
that she has psychological resources other than beliefs to perform ordi-
nary human actions. If this is what she has in mind, then she has a dif-
fi cult task to show that it is indeed possible to live in this way and that 
such a life is not based on a philosophical logos. I do not think that this 
is what Sextus is doing. On the other hand, she can be taken to mean 
that she refuses to describe her actions in terms of beliefs because such 
a description is philosophical logos, and this, I believe, is all that Sex-
tus intends. To say that a Pyrrhonist’s choice to save her parents is in 
accordance with non-philosophical practice is just to say that there is 
a perfectly good explanation of her action which is not based on any of 
the dogmatic theories of human action. The explanation of her action 
includes only her decision to act in accordance with customs and laws, 
but not the fact that she suspend beliefs. Suspension of beliefs, as far 
as the Pyrrhonist’s practical life is concerned, explains why she fares 
better than the dogmatists and why she is able to achieve tranquility.
Hence, the Pyrrhonists are immune to the apraxia objection because 
it is based on the misunderstanding of their position, that is, on the 
wrong assumption that they live in accordance with philosophical lo-
gos. To live in accordance with philosophical logos includes two things. 
First, it includes the idea that one should apply one’s philosophical 
tenets, concepts and recommendations to ordinary human life and use 
them as a practical guide. However, the only item that survives skepti-
cal philosophy, appearance, is not used in this way: as I have tried to 
show in Section 2, appearances are criteria of skeptical practice in that 
the skeptics do not reject any of them in their life. Second, it includes 
the idea that ordinary human life can be, and should be, described in 
philosophical terms. However, the skeptics refuse to describe their ac-
tions in philosophical terms. All that is needed to describe a Pyrrhon-
ist’s action is to point to a pattern of the fourfold regime of everyday 
life: when she is hungry, she eats, when she must decide whether to 
save her parents or not, she follows the laws and customs, etc.20
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